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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”), founded in 1995,1 has
been crucial to the expansion of the world’s economy. States’ markets
and economies would not be as intertwined today without the WTO’s
existence. Although scholars can point out its flaws, economists consider
membership in the WTO, and the liberalization of trade in general, as a
positive.2 The United States, one of the original members of the WTO,3
has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the WTO’s efforts to unite the
global economy. Specifically, American companies and producers have
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1
Kathleen Claussen, The Other Trade War, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 3
(2018).
2
See id. at 4-5.
3
See id. at 3.
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been able to export their goods around the world without the fear of high
tariffs.4
However, despite the WTO’s success, the United States is attempting
to cripple the organization by targeting its dispute resolution system.
Specifically, the United States is preventing the Appellate Body, the final
authority of the WTO’s dispute resolution system, from remaining fully
staffed. The United States is entitled to block appointments of panelists
to the Appellate Body, and is doing so with each opportunity it gets.5 The
result of the United States’ obstinance is that the Appellate Body is at
risk of becoming impotent because term limits cause it to shrink as
judicial appointments remain vacant. This article argues that the United
States’ attack on the Appellate Body is a breach of its obligation to the
WTO and places the future of the global economy in jeopardy.
Part I of this comment will provide a general history of the WTO
and explain its dispute resolution system, which is its largest tool in
controlling global trade. Part II will explain why the Marrakesh
Agreement6—and international treaties in general—bind states to
obligations that they may not legally violate. Part III will outline the
United States’ attack on the WTO’s dispute resolution system and the
global response to its behavior. Part IV contemplates what a global
economy would look like without the WTO, or without the United States
in the WTO. Finally, Part V analyzes WTO members’ potential recourse
to prevent the United States from dismantling the WTO’s dispute
resolution system.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO AND ITS DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SYSTEM
A. The Origin of the WTO
The idea to interweave the economies of different states to form a
united global economy did not originate with the World Trade
Organization. Prior to 1995, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) had been attempting the same project for decades.7 The
4

See id.
See Simon Lester, Comment to Blocking WTO appointment hurts US goal of
resolving unfair trade, holds system hostage, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA (Jun. 22, 2018, 6:38
AM),
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/trump-block-wtoappointment-hurts-unfair-trade-case-10449820.
6
See infra note 41.
5

7

See Claussen, supra note 1, at 3.
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GATT was formed in 1947 in response to the havoc of World War II.8
As the predecessor to the WTO, the GATT experimented with liberalized
trade and set the stage for the WTO to thrive. Members of the GATT
hoped to create an organization called the International Trade
Organization (“ITO”) to work with the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund in furthering global economic goals.9 The GATT was not
meant to be long-lasting, and states expected the ITO to subsume it in
due time.10 Ironically, this never occurred because the United States
(who had pushed for the ITO’s existence) failed to ratify the ITO’s
charter, which effectively killed it.11
Even without the ITO, the GATT was integral to setting the stage for
the WTO. GATT members would routinely get together to discuss tariffs
and protectionist trade barriers.12 These talks not only helped states begin
to trade more freely with one another, but also fostered trust and
confidence among them.13 The average tariff faced by importers in 1947
was around 40%. Throughout the GATT-era, tariffs steadily declined
such that today’s importers typically face 5% tariffs.14 The trust and
confidence that resulted from this economic and political warmth was
welcomed considering the fact that the GATT was formed directly after
world powers terrorized each other twice in two world wars within a
half-century of each other.
The GATT’s successes were applaudable, but the organization had
several flaws which enabled the WTO to emerge as its replacement.15
The largest of its flaws involved its ineffective dispute resolution
system.16 Because unanimity was required in approving resolutions to
disputes, the losing party of a dispute was able to block the enforcement
of a decision against it.17 Among other flawed functions, GATT
members were ready to form an improved organization to govern their
8

See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ALAN O. SYKES, THE GENESIS OF
(2008); see also Claussen, supra note 1, at 3.
9
See id. at 98-99.
10
See Claussen, supra note 1, at 3; From the GATT to the WTO: A Brief Overview,
GEORGETOWN LAW, https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=363556&p=4108235 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2019).
11
See IRWIN, MAVROIDIS & SYKES, supra note 8, at 122.
12
See id. at 117-18.
13
See id.
14
See id. at 30; Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Starting Point: Tariff
Levels Circa 1947 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21782, 2015).
15
See SARAH LOUISE JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 9
(2011).
16
See id. at 8.
17
Id.
THE GATT 2
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trade agreements.18 At the GATT’s final set of talks in the late 20th
century, known as the Uruguay Rounds, the WTO was created.19
The WTO, like the GATT before it, attempts to enhance and unite
the global economy.20 Members of the WTO are equal with one another
when it comes to trade. This egalitarianism is manifested in the WTO by
way of the most-favored-nation principle, which holds that states are
forbidden from treating some nations better than others by giving allies
more attractive tariffs.21 Although there is an exception for states joining
in a trade agreement, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”), states generally cannot apply different measures to different
states’ products.22 Furthermore, WTO members cannot engage in a
variety of activities that would create unfair trade advantages, including
subsidizing domestic producers so they can undercut foreign producers.23
The WTO relies on one key organ to retain credibility among its
members: the dispute resolution system’s Appellate Body.24 The
Appellate Body issues rulings like any judicial body in response to
potential violations of WTO rules .25 It has become a centerpiece of the
WTO and exists to self-regulate WTO members with consistency and
coherency.26 However, if the Appellate Body is understaffed to the point
that it cannot form a panel to hear a dispute, members could simply
appeal the lower panel’s ruling, aware that the appeal will never be heard
by the Appellate Body. By doing so, members could effectively violate
WTO rules without punishment.
When the Appellate Body is staffed, it improves upon the GATT’s
dispute resolution system in a few ways. Member states can bring claims
against violating members and feel confident that a just outcome will
result. These outcomes come in multiple forms: cessation of the
prohibited activity, payment of a fine to the victimized member(s), and
18

See id.
See IRWIN, MAVROIDIS & SYKES, supra note 8, at 121.
20
See Bown & Irwin, supra note 14, at 1
21
See IRWIN, MAVROIDIS & SYKES, supra note 8, at 38-40.
22
See id. at 263 (explaining that states engaged in bilateral agreements “grant
reductions or bindings of its import tariffs of which the other was an important supplier,”
which are “generalized to third countries either by virtue of most-favored-nation
obligations or as a matter of policy.”).
23
See Subsidies and countervailing measures, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
24
See Hélène Ruiz Fabri, The WTO Appellate Body or Judicial Power Unleashed:
Sketches from the Procedural Side of the Story, 27(4) European Journal of International
Law (EJIL) (2016) 1076.
25
See id.
26
Id. at 1078.
19
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retaliatory measures against the offending member.27 First, an offending
state is asked to stop violating a WTO rule, such as an illegal tariff rate.
If it fails to comply, it is asked to pay money to the victim member in
the amount equal to the damage caused by the violation.28 Finally, after
continued noncompliance, the WTO allows the victim to issue retaliatory
measures against the offender to recover its losses.29 An example of this
final stage was demonstrated by China and the European Union when
they placed otherwise illegal tariffs on American products, such as
Harley-Davidson motorcycles and Kentucky bourbon, after the United
States placed tariffs on Chinese steel and EU aluminum.30
Without a robust dispute resolution system, the WTO would have a
difficult time promoting free trade or enforcing its rules. In fact, it is
likely that the WTO as a whole would fail if its dispute resolution system
fails. Unfortunately for the WTO’s proponents, one of its founding
members, the United States, is attempting to paralyze the Appellate
Body. Due to this attempted paralysis, the near future looks bleak
because the Appellate Body requires at least three panelists to operate,
and terms are expiring.31

B. The United States’ Role in the Dispute Resolution System
The Appellate Body is made up of seven judges but only requires a
minimum of three to function, as only three serve on each panel.32
Appointments, which are made by the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)
to the Appellate Body, require consensus among WTO members.33
Approval of an appointment is inferred; therefore, a member must
formally object to an appointee if it wishes to veto the appointment.34
The United States, like any member, has a right to veto appointments to
27
William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 25, (Illinois Public Law
Research Working Paper No. 03-08, 2003).
28
See id.
29
Id.
30
See id.; Chinese retaliatory tariffs aim to hit Trump in his electoral base, THE
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jun/24/tariffs-trump-china-redstates-retaliation (last updated Jun. 24, 2018).
31
See Davey, supra note 27, at 14.

Appellate
Body
Members,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2019).
33
WTO Members Intensify Debate Over Resolving Appellate Body Impasse,
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (Jun. 28, 2018),
32

https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/wto-members-intensify-debate-overresolving-appellate-body-impasse.
34

Id.
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break the consensus. Feeling as though it has been treated unfairly by the
Appellate Body, the United States has exercised its veto consistently
since President Donald Trump began his administration in 2017.35 As a
result, only three panelists remain on the Appellate Body. The move by
the United States to cripple the Appellate Body has widely been met with
disapproval; specifically, the chief of the Appellate Body, Chair Ujal
Sigh Bhatia, has said that the United States is going to “warp [the WTO]
back to the GATT era” concerning dispute resolution.36
One of the reasons for opposing the WTO, according to the United
States, is its unfair treatment of the United States when it is involved in
trade disputes.37 The Trump Administration has stated that the United
States is treated unfairly,38 signaling that it believes the United States
does not prevail in front of the Appellate Body often enough for it to be
considered a just process. The United States, however, wins eightyseven percent of the claims it brings to the WTO.39 Additionally, its loss
rate when a claim is brought against it is lower than that of the average
WTO state.40 Therefore, the United States’ opposition to the WTO does
not have a basis for a claim of unfair treatment, unless the current
administration feels that complete American domination is the only fair
outcome in trade disputes. The United States phenomenal win record in
trade disputes illustrates its dominant presence in the WTO, which begs
the question: why would the United States wish to harm the
organization?
Simply put, the United States newfound desire to frustrate the
WTO’s ambition of liberalized trade stems from the current
administration’s desire for protectionist policies. The WTO’s purpose is
to remove trade barriers, which is necessarily incompatible with a state’s
objective of instituting protectionist policies. The WTO’s charter
explains that the parties to the agreement are “desirous of contributing to
these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
Ana Swanson, Trump Cripples W.T.O. as Trade War Rages, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/08/business/trump-trade-warwto.html.
36
See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, supra
note 33.
37
See Swanson, supra note 35.
38
See id.
39
Henrietta Reily, By the numbers: Here’s how “badly” the WTO treats the
U.S., AXIOS (Jul. 07, 2018), https://www.axios.com/by-the-numbers-wtostreated-the-united-states-very-badly-1530622593-14ba45da-e0da-462f-974ef8792a086177.html.
40
Id.
35
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barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international trade relations.”41 These objectives are in opposition of the
current American administration’s normative view of the American
economy, and who it should reward.
Another possible motivation for paralyzing the Appellate Body
is to prevent the WTO from forcing the United States to reel back on its
steel and aluminum tariffs it has imposed on China. The United States
has used the GATT Article XXI “National Security” exception to impose
those tariffs, which many consider in violation of WTO rules against
unfair border measures.42 This exception is “self-judging” however,
leading to potential for abuse.43 The text of Article XXI is as follows:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
...
(b) to prevent any [member country] from taking any
action which it considers necessary for the protection of
its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from
which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or
(c) to prevent any [member country] from taking any
action in pursuance of its obligations under the United

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
42
Scott Miller, National Security Exception: When Trade Rules Don’t Apply,
TRADE VISTAS (Jun. 1, 2017), https://tradevistas.org/national-securityexception-trade-rules-dont-apply/.
43
Id. at 3.
41
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Nations Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security.44
The exception leaves room for the United States—which believes
that stunting China’s ability to undercut American steel producers is
essential to national security—to impose harmful tariffs under the guise
of national security.45 Therefore, perhaps the United States has sought to
dismantle the Appellate Body in preparation for claiming this exemption.
The “National Security” exception within Article XXI provides
members with almost unchecked power to ignore WTO rules. The only
check is an eventual Appellate Body ruling. If the Appellate Body is
unable to function, however, then the power of the member state
exercising the exemption becomes completely unchecked.
The United States could argue that it is simply exercising its right as
a member of the WTO; however, attempting to destroy the organization
is not permitted under its obligations to the WTO. The founding
document of the WTO, the Marrakesh Agreement, as well as principles
of international law provide ammunition for those who oppose the
United States’ behavior.

III. THE MARRAKESH AGREEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
The Marrakesh Agreement, signed in Morocco in 1994, serves as the
charter for the WTO.46 The twenty-three founding members of the GATT
were the original parties of the Marrakesh Agreement.47 Throughout the
past decades, from the GATT to the present WTO, WTO membership
has increased to 128 total members.48 The United States was both a
founding member of the GATT and a party to the Marrakesh Agreement,
meaning that it willingly subjected itself to the treaty and all its
corresponding legal obligations.49
44
Brandon J. Murrill, The “National Security Exception” and the World Trade
Organization, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 2 (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/LSB10223.pdf.
45
Todd Tucker, The WTO just blew up Trump’s argument for steel tariffs, WASH. POST
(Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/05/wto-just-blew-uptrumps-argument-steel-tariffs/.
46
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 41.
47
See Press Release, World Trade Org., Fifteenth Anniversary of the Multilateral
Trading
Sys.,
2,
4,
(2009),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm.
48
Id. at 1.
49
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 41 (demonstrating that the United States is a
signatory); See Claussen, supra note 1, at 3 (showing that the United States was a leading
party in the founding of the GATT).
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The United States’ zealous advocacy of the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement is evidence of its
belief that the Marrakesh Agreement has legal obligations. The TRIPS
Agreement was intensely advocated by the United States because it
helped protect American companies.50 The United States believed this
agreement to be binding and instructed other states that they were bound
by WTO obligations.51 Currently, however, the United States has
seemingly forgotten its stance on the Marrakesh Agreement’s binding
authority, as it is breaching its obligation to adhere to the WTO’s dispute
resolution process.
The Marrakesh Agreement imposes specific obligations that prohibit
the United States’ present activity. Article II of the Marrakesh
Agreement declares that Annexes 1, 2, and 3 (each an “Annex”) are
integral parts of the Agreement, and are binding on all of the WTO’s
members.52 Annex 2 outlines binding principles and obligations
concerning the dispute resolution system.53 Article III of Annex 2
outlines general principles agreed to by the members as to the purpose of
the WTO’s dispute resolution system.54 Included in this section is the
principle that the dispute resolution system’s goal is to find mutually
beneficial results,55 not domination by one member. Furthermore,
members agreed to the declaration that the dispute resolution system is
essential to the WTO’s security and effectiveness.56 Therefore, members
agree that without the dispute resolution system, the WTO cannot be
secure or effective. The Annex also obliges that all solutions, including
arbitration awards, made “under the consultation and dispute settlement
provisions . . . shall not . . . impede the attainment of any objective” of
agreements made pertaining to the organization, operation, and
effectiveness of the dispute resolution system.57
Other provisions in Annex 2 all present clear objectives, including
timeliness and fairness requirements, which cannot be impeded without

50

See Linda Lourie, US position on TRIPS, in GRAIN 77-83 (Steve Eberhart ed., 1998),
https://www.grain.org/article/entries/2105-us-position-on-trips.
51
See id.
52
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 41, at 155 (Article II is titled “Scope of the
WTO”).
53
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
54
Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.
55
See id. art. 3, ¶ 3-4.
56
Id. art. 21, ¶ 1.
57
See id. art. 3, ¶ 5.
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directly violating the Marrakesh Agreement.58 Article 17 of Annex 2,
titled “Appellate Review,” outlines numerous objectives. Section 1 states
the following:
A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the
DSB. The Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel
cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of
whom shall serve on any one case. Persons serving on
the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation
shall be determined in the working procedures of the
Appellate Body.59
Despite these objectives, appellate panels cannot be established
because the United States is blocking their formation, and a rotation
cannot occur if the Appellate Body has fewer than four members. Thus,
virtually every objective envisioned by this section is impeded by the
United States’ behavior.
Section 2 of Article 17 discusses how often members of the
Appellate Body should be appointed.60 The key phrase within this section
is that “[v]acancies shall be filled as they arise.” 61 The United States’
public stonewalling of the filling of vacancies impedes the mandate that
the vacancies be filled as they arise. The wording of the section, that
vacancies shall be filled, leaves no room to contend that states have
discretion about whether the Appellate Body should be fully staffed or
not. Despite this directive, the United States has made it no secret that it
wishes for the vacancies to remain.62
Section 5 of Article 17 establishes a general rule that
proceedings should be resolved within 60 days.63 If the United States
continues on its path of purposefully depriving the Appellate Body of its
staff, there will not be an Appellate Body to resolve disputes within 60
days. Thus, the United States’ behavior likely impedes the timeliness
objective in Section 5, even if the imposition is indirect.
Article 17, which contains various Appellate Body procedural
requirements, is being impeded by the United States. Moreover,
impeding objectives laid out by the Marrakesh Agreement is a violation
of a party’s legally binding obligations under that agreement. Therefore,
the United States is in breach of the Marrakesh Agreement.
58
59
60
61
62
63

DSU, supra note 53, art. 3, ¶ 5.
Id. art. 17, ¶ 1.
Id. art. 17, ¶ 2.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Swanson, supra note 35.
Id. art. 17, ¶ 5.
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The Trump Administration treats international treaties as
nonbinding, so it is likely that the Administration finds a breach of the
Marrakesh Agreement to be of no legal consequence.64 However,
centuries of international law and scholarly support demonstrate that this
is not the case. The head of the American Society of International Law,
Law Professor Frederic Kirgis, has addressed the question of
international treaties’ binding authority on the United States, such as the
Marrakesh Agreement.65 Importantly, academics believe that
international treaties are treated as binding because of the concept of
comity, which influences a nation to respect an agreement so other
nations also respect it.66 Additionally, Kirgis argues that the United
States has historically considered treaties binding because it has treated
them like disputes arising under domestic contract law.67
Support for the United States’ position that treaties are binding is
also found in the Constitution, which prescribes treaties as “supreme law
of the land[.]”68 Although supporters of the Trump Administration may
argue that international law is too murky to consider international treaties
binding, scholars disagree. Kirgis argues that the United States has
always held the belief that international treaties should be binding on
those who sign them: “The United States government has frequently
demonstrated that it regards treaties (including treaties for U.S.
constitutional purposes as well as other international agreements) as
binding instruments under international law.”69 It appears that the Trump
Administration’s argument is not supported by scholarship or historical
practice.
Nevertheless, the Trump Administration will likely continue arguing
that the United States can breach its international obligations, despite
historical practice. As a result, other states may try to force the United
States to respect a treaty it has signed, but their efforts would not likely
64

See David Roberts, The Paris climate agreement is at risk of falling apart in the
2020s,
Vox
(Nov.
5,
2019),
https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2019/11/5/20947289/paris-climate-agreement-2020s-breakdown-trump
(demonstrating how the Trump Administration disregards its international obligations of
other treaties, such as the Paris Climate Accords).
65
Frederic L. Kirgis, Treaties as Binding International Obligation, AMERICAN SOC’Y
INT’L L. (May 14, 1997), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/2/issue/4/treaties-bindinginternational-obligation.
66

Id.
For example, the United States accused France of breach of contract
following a failure to live up to obligations laid out in the 1946 Air Service
Agreement. Id.
68
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
69
Kirgis, supra note 65 (explaining how the United States historically viewed
treaties, like domestic contract law, as binding).
67
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be successful. If the United States derogates from its international
obligations with a treaties-mean-nothing attitude, what would come of
the United States’ place in the world? The United States may soon find
itself on the outside looking in on the global policy discussion, especially
as other states’ power increases, such as Brazil.70 Moreover, other states
may view United States policy towards international treaties as
contingent upon the election for president every four years. Inevitably,
states may choose to simply leave the United States out of the global
policy conversation.

IV. RESPONSES TO THE UNITED STATES’ BEHAVIOR
The United States’ belief that the WTO’s dispute resolution system
needs reform is not unique. At least 18 other members have shared
similar concerns.71 However, none of those members planned to
unilaterally halt the Appellate Body’s operations. The United States’
attempt at doing so has provoked international condemnation and
opposition.
France has cautioned the United States against its current course.
President Emmanuel Macron has stated that the United States’ trade war
with China, and broader disrespect of the WTO rules, presents a prospect
where “everyone loses.”72 Further, he stated that “[t]he strong nation is
the one following the law,” signaling the French belief that the United
States is breaking the law by stalling the WTO’s dispute resolution
system.73 Other French officials have echoed President Macron’s
statements, warning that unilateral trade actions cannot replace the
WTO’s multilateral system, and arguing that actions taken for the
purpose of paralyzing the organization must cease.74
Germany has also responded to both the United States’ use of the
national security exception and its eagerness to dismantle the Appellate
Body. In response to threats made by President Trump concerning the
As of January 2019, Brazil’s stock market is performing better than the
United States’ market. Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil is the Best Stock Market in the
(Jan.
8,
2019
12:34
PM),
World
Right
Now,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/01/08/brazil-is-the-best-stockmarket-in-the-world-right-now/#2d3d672771d5.
70

71

Claussen, supra note 1, at 21 (citing Terence P. Stewart, Can the WTO be Saved
from Itself? (2018)).
72
See Macron urges WTO ‘reform’ as US metal tariffs expected to hit early, EURACTIV
2 (May 31, 2018), https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/macron-urgeswto-reform-as-us-metal-tariffs-expected-to-hit-early/.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 3.

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

211

imposition of steep tariffs on the EU, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated
that the dispute between the United States and the EU has the hallmarks
of a trade conflict, and that it is “worth every effort to try to defuse this
conflict[.]”75 Furthermore, Chancellor Merkel mentioned that it “takes
two” to prevent a trade war, indicating that the EU cannot avoid a trade
war without American cooperation.76 Additionally, Chancellor Merkel
warned that the United States’ attempt to take down the WTO is unwise
because global problems require multilateral answers.77 Accordingly, she
warned President Trump that “protectionism is not the proper answer.”78
Canadian officials strongly back the WTO and resent the United
States’ behavior.79 Canada proposed changes to the WTO’s dispute
resolution system in an attempt to discourage protectionist measures like
those that have been implemented in the United States.80 Canada is a
strong proponent of the WTO and of multilateral trading systems in
general.81 For example, in 2014, Canada led the charge in launching
negotiations that expanded environmental protections in the WTO.82
Thus, Canada opposes the United States’ goal to inhibit the WTO’s
efficacy.
Yet the strongest opposition to the United States’ attempt at
impeding the Appellate Body has come from India, China, and the
European Union. In December 2018, these member states united to do
more than simply state their dissatisfaction with the United States: they
offered a solution.83 The Marrakesh Agreement did not contemplate an
75
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instance where a founding member, or any member for that matter,
would deliberately attack the organization to which it was bound. As a
result, no safeguards to this situation were originally put in place.
However, India, China, and the EU have proposed a response to the
United States’ actions,84 which seeks to accomplish two key objectives.
First, the proposal would increase the number of panelists in the
Appellate Body from seven to nine total panelists and extend their term
duration by two years.85 Second, outgoing Appellate Body panelists
would remain in their positions in order to fulfil the panel’s duties until
their positions have been filled.86 The proposal appears to allow the
WTO to operate as planned without fear that a member could effectively
stall operations. In practice, the proposed changes would ensure that the
Appellate Body could continue operation despite protectionist regimes
sprouting up in a member’s government.
Aside from its support for the proposal, India has consistently
criticized the United States’ behavior. Perhaps India’s strong opposition
stems from the fact that it has a particular interest in the WTO’s dispute
resolution system’s vitality: India is a claimant against the United States
in a dispute over steel tariffs.87 India successfully established a panel to
hear the claim in December 2018; however, India would require a
functioning Appellate Body if it wanted to bring an eventual appeal.88
This fact is not lost on India, and may explain why it vigorously supports
repairing the Appellate Body. Overall, India has made it clear that it
disagrees with American tactics and hopes to see the Appellate Body
recover from its current position.
China, in addition to its proposal with India and the European Union,
has publicly admonished the United States.89 Regarding the United
States’ behavior, a Chinese official stated the following in December
2018: “A top dog should act like a top dog. It cannot only see a narrow
spectrum of its own self-interest, and it certainly should not do whatever
it wishes at the sacrifice of others.”90 This comment was met with
support from Canada and Japan, who both disapprove of the steel and
84
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aluminum tariffs the United States has imposed on China. However,
China’s comments should be taken with a grain of salt since it has long
been seen as the United States’ primary challenger for possession of the
world’s most dominant economy.91 Therefore, China’s opposition to the
United States’ current disapproval of liberalized trade could simply be
China trying to seize an opportunity.
China has taken such opportunities before. In 2016, when the United
States ceased negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, one scholar
commented that China had been left to “dominate Asia.”92 China took
the opportunity to fill the void left by the United States, by assuring its
Asian neighbors that investment and trade should go through Chinese led
coalitions.93 Perhaps China currently sees a similar opportunity to fill the
void in the WTO that may be left by the United States.
Around the world, WTO members consistently disagree with the
United States’ current tactics. Specifically, traditional allies like France,
Japan, Germany, and Canada have provided vocal, public opposition to
the Trump Administration’s actions in international trade. Other
countries, such as India and China have gone beyond voicing opposition
to propose changes that would protect the WTO. Whether the
motivations behind that proposal are genuine or not, the United States’
behavior has certainly caused international upheaval.

V. A GLOBAL ECONOMY WITHOUT THE WTO
The global economy would look much different if the WTO ceased
to exist. The benefit of the WTO to the global economy can be seen by
viewing reports about annual trade performance. Those reports reveal a
key aspect of the WTO as it concerns global growth; the WTOs goal is to
increase all global trade rather than just trade involving its largest
members.94 For example, under the WTO, developing nations have seen
growth in trade volume across all kinds of products, including
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agricultural products, oil and mining products, and merchandise.95 At
least a portion of this growth can likely be attributed to the WTO’s use of
the most-favored-nation principle, allowing for developing nations to
participate in the global economy on equal footing.96
For manufacturers of goods from large states, the WTO offers the
opportunity to spread their products around the world. Consider the
WTO’s significant function of regulating border measures, such as
heightened tariffs. Who pays for tariffs? States do not pay for them.
Companies do.97 Restricting China from imposing an inconsistent tariff
on televisions enables foreign manufacturers of televisions to more easily
enter China’s 1.5-billion-person market.98 Thus, when China is restricted
from imposing that tariff, foreign manufacturers evade paying the tariff
rather than the states themselves. For this reason, the presence of the
WTO is important. Without it, foreign manufacturers and exporters
would foot the bill for heightened tariffs, which could harm existing
industries, raise the prices of goods, and stifle trade all together.99
Open economies grow faster and more steadily than their closed
counterparts.100 The WTO forces all of its members to have open
economies. Economies which grow rapidly require new jobs to meet the
increased output requirements.101 Departing the WTO for protectionist
policies results in the loss of jobs.102 Prior to the WTO, when the
international system was dominated by protectionist policies,
unemployment rates and import rates of goods were linked.103 After the
WTO emerged, however, imports rose dramatically while unemployment
dropped or remained steady.104 It can be inferred from this data that open
trade enables employers from all states to expand and begin exporting all
over the world. Although imports dramatically increased with the
introduction of the WTO, each state dramatically increased its exports as
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well.105 This data demonstrates that high import rates do not lead to high
unemployment, and that free trade among open economies can lead to
job growth. A world without the WTO could revert back to an
environment where manufacturers find it more difficult to profit abroad
and unemployment rises.106
Another implication of a world without the WTO is that member
states would be forced to negotiate independent trade agreements with
each other. This may prove challenging. For example, only forty-seven
percent of the United States’ trade is covered by independent free trade
agreements,107 while the standard WTO rules cover the remaining fiftythree percent of its trade. For large states like the United States, perhaps
negotiating independent free trade agreements would not be a significant
issue because larger states may be able to strongarm smaller states into
favorable trade agreements. However, smaller states’ negotiation power,
such as in Southeast Asia, would not likely be able to produce
independent trade agreements that offer such states protection equal to
that currently offered by the WTO. Furthermore, independent free trade
agreements may not be able to be enforced against large states without
accountability protections built into international organizations like the
WTO.
Alternatively, problems will result if the WTO does not dissolve but
continues to be denied an effective dispute resolution system. At best,
WTO members would be expected to follow WTO rules out of honor
with no real recourse for disputes. For example, the EU has suspicions
that the current iteration of NAFTA, following the Trump
Administrations reworking of it, violates WTO rules.108 However,
assuming the Appellate Body is not repaired, the EU has no real recourse
to attempt to vindicate its claim against the United States, Canada, or
Mexico if NAFTA does violate WTO rules. The EU’s only recourse
would be to impose countermeasures against those states, without an
official WTO order. Perhaps some do not fear a world where the EU or
the United States can impose retributive measures for WTO violations.
However, such a system would open the door to abuse of smaller, poorer
members by larger members. The WTO expressly sought to prevent this
from happening.
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Furthermore, a future in which the United States is not a party to the
WTO can be imagined. In that potential reality, the loser might be the
United States if the WTO thrived without its membership. WTO
members may perceive the United States as an unpredictable trade
partner, not only because of its behavior when it was a member of the
WTO, but also because the United States would not have to follow a set
of international trade rules. The United States’ social and political
capital, as well as the respect that the United States possesses because of
its status as a founding member of the international economic system,
may be lost upon its theoretical departure from the WTO. In fact,
American business would likely see less growth in a world where the
United States is not a member of the WTO,109 considering the fact that
American companies will likely see a reduction in economic growth due
to the tariffs implemented on Chinese exports.110 Without the WTO,
tariffs like these could be implemented at the United States’ discretion
and completely unrestricted by WTO Rules, resulting in stymied
economic growth.
The United States believes that it is being treated unfairly by the
Appellate Body and has attempted to take the whole system hostage as a
solution. If one of the remaining three Appellate Body panelists departs,
it would be impossible for the Appellate Body to function. How can
WTO members stop the United States from successfully destroying the
Appellate Body?

VI. RECOURSE FOR WTO MEMBERS
The Marrakesh Agreement has a section dedicated to a withdrawal
process for states that choose to remove themselves from the agreement’s
obligations. The withdrawal process, defined in Article XV, enables a
party to unilaterally decide to exit the WTO six months after requesting
to do so.111 Withdrawing from the WTO also extinguishes all legal
obligations stemming from the WTO’s multilateral trade agreements.112
The United States, unhappy with the WTO, could exercise its right to
withdrawal.
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However, the treaty does not contemplate an instance where a
member remains in the WTO with the intention of pursuing the
organization’s demise. As a result, there is no mechanism to vote to
expel a member state.
In the absence of a vote to expel the United States, other WTO
members could involve the United Nations’ International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”). Although this is not necessarily the United Nation’s
concern, the ICJ’s Statute provides:
The States parties to the present Statute may at any time
declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other State
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the
interpretation
of
a
treaty;
(b) any
question
of
international
law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of an international
obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of an international obligation.113
As stated in the statute, the ICJ’s jurisdiction is compulsory upon
parties who consented to the ICJ statute when a dispute falls under the
scope of that consent.114 Article 36 of the ICJ Statute states that the ICJ
has compulsory jurisdiction concerning the interpretation of a treaty or
determining if a state has breached an international obligation.115
The United States’ behavior in the WTO poses issues that fall into
both categories for establishing the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction:
whether the Marrakesh Agreement allows for the United States’
interpretation resulting in deliberate paralysis of the Appellate Body and
whether the United States is in breach of an international obligation for
doing so. However, the United States does not accept the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction, so hailing them to court would prove difficult.
Even assuming the United States accepts its jurisdiction, the ICJ
cannot enforce its decision.116 Without enforcement authority, it follows
113
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that a potential ICJ declaration would not likely change the United States
tactics. At best, the ICJ would simply be another voice discouraging the
United States’ behavior.
However, there is some utility in getting the ICJ involved, despite a
lack of enforcement authority. An ICJ ruling against the United States
may be a catalyst for WTO members to initiate the United States to cease
its stalling efforts. Currently, the WTO’s limited scope prevents it from
ruling on the question of whether the United States’ behavior constitutes
a breach of its obligations. The WTO’s tribunals only determine whether
its members are abiding by regulations about tariffs, bilateral treaties, or
other trade related issues.117 An ICJ opinion condemning the United
States’ behavior as a breach of its international obligations would be the
first authoritative declaration of its kind.
Another possible solution is to appease the United States.
According to former WTO director-general Pascal Lamy, President
Trump’s protectionism has offered an opportunity to make reforms to the
WTO rules.118 Lamy believes that the United States 2018 steel and
aluminum tariffs violate WTO rules, whereas Chinese subsidies that
damage American companies are permissible because of the vagueness
of the current WTO rules.119 Lamy argues that there is a need to change
WTO rules to account for China’s rapid growth since the last round of
rule changes.120 A call to change the WTO rules would likely please the
Trump Administration, and the prospect of the United States’ departure
from the WTO might spark long overdue amendments to WTO rules.121
Thus, the United States’ tactics may spark important change which
would benefit large members like the United States, which in turn may
convince the United States to cease its attack on the Appellate Body.
Another option for WTO members remains: they can wait. It
may not be as palatable a route in light of the other options previously
described but waiting until the United States transitions to an
administration that is potentially friendlier to free trade may be the best
solution. Under this option, the WTO could continue to create rules in
preparation for a rejuvenated Appellate Body. Considering the United
States’ historical commitment to free trade, as well as the fact that it was
a founding member of the GATT and the WTO, it is not unfounded to
117
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suggest that the next American President would recommit America to the
WTO.

VII. CONCLUSION
The United States reaps benefits from the WTO. However, it seems
that any advantages the WTO provides to the United States are not
sufficient to retain its allegiance. The United States’ deliberate attempt to
render the Appellate Body impotent has caused its allies and rivals to
voice concern. In turn, the United States’ behavior has diminished its
credibility on the global stage and cost American exporters large sums of
money. Ultimately, however, its actions are in violation of a binding
international agreement.
If the world hopes to prevent the WTO from becoming ineffective, it
must step up and convince the United States to alter its course. States
must not forget the benefit of supranational organizations, such as the
WTO, which seek to unite the many great nations of this world. The
devastation caused by the two World Wars serves as a stark reminder of
the importance of global unity. The WTO promotes that unity.

